In practice, some high-risk pipelines require more frequent reviews, while stable systems may not benefit from rigid calendar-driven cycles. The real question is not “How often?” but “Under which conditions should an integrity review be performed?”

This article explains how integrity review frequency should be determined and why a risk-based approach is essential.

Determining whether a pipeline is fit for continued operation is one of the most critical decisions in pipeline integrity management. Yet, this decision is often oversimplified and reduced to a single question: “Is the remaining wall thickness acceptable?”

Fitness for continued operation is not a thickness criterion. It is a multidimensional engineering judgment that integrates defect characteristics, degradation mechanisms, operating conditions, and risk tolerance.

This article explains what truly makes a pipeline fit (or unfit) for continued operation, and why relying on isolated inspection metrics leads to unsafe decisions.

Defining pipeline system limits is one of the most underestimated steps in pipeline integrity management. In integrated upstream–downstream environments, pipelines rarely operate as isolated assets. They are connected to wells, processing facilities, platforms, storage systems, and utilities, often managed by different teams or even different entities.

Poorly defined system limits are a recurring root cause of integrity gaps, missed inspection scopes, unclear responsibilities, and inconsistent operating practices. This article explains how pipeline system limits should be defined and why this definition is fundamental to effective integrity management.

In-line inspection (ILI) tools and leak detection systems are often perceived as the backbone of pipeline integrity management. Many operators assume that as long as pipelines are regularly inspected and equipped with leak detection, integrity risks are adequately controlled.

Industry experience shows the opposite: a significant number of pipeline failures occur in systems that were inspected and monitored. The issue is not the lack of technology, but the misconception that inspection and detection alone are sufficient to manage integrity.

This article explains why pipeline integrity cannot be reduced to ILI and leak detection, and why integrity management must be approached as a broader, risk-based process.

In many organizations, Pipeline Integrity Management Systems (PIMS) are still perceived as a combination of periodic inspections, in-line inspections (ILI), and leak detection systems. While these elements are essential, they represent only a fraction of what an effective PIMS must deliver.